In this paper we analyze the determinants of CoCo bond issuance. Moreover, the results suggest that banks who issue CoCo bonds in the BRICS and other emerging countries are typically large and have high leverage, aiming to meet the Basel III rules and replace debt with equity funding.
Introduction
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 triggered the world's biggest financial crisis since the crash in 1929. The years leading up to the 2008 crisis saw a flood of irresponsible mortgage lending in America, excess savings in Asia, and a pattern of European banks borrowing in American money markets and using the funds to buy doubtful securities (The Economist, 2013) . Years of low inflation and stable growth -"The Great Moderation" -fostered complacency and risk-taking.
In a globalized economy with increased presence of transnational corporations, the crisis spread worldwide, affecting mainly the European Union's economy. Many market players suffered huge losses or went bankrupt and governments were called upon to intervene. Specialists and analysts questioned the external capital input in banks to avoid their bankruptcy (bail-outs) -especially by governments. These specialists suggested bail-in rescue policies, meaning internal mechanisms to solve their financial distress.
In this context, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, created in 1975, submitted the Basel III accord -a comprehensive set of reform measures to strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of the banking sector (BIS, 2011) . The main proposition of Basel III is to increase the bank-level of regulatory capital, which can be decomposed into Tier 1, additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 (see more in Fig. 3 in the appendix). Tier 1 capital is high-quality capital that is able to absorb losses in a going concern context whereas the Tier 2 capital is supposed to absorb losses in a gone concern context (De Spiegeleer and Schoutens, 2011) . This regulatory framework classified hybrid instruments, called contingent convertible bonds (CoCo bonds), in the additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 categories, according to trigger levels.
Issuance of CoCo bonds by banks, allow them to borrow money whereby the investors has hybrid bond that can be transform this debt into equity if a pre-specified trigger event occurs. In other words, CoCo bonds are debt instruments that can mostly be converted into equity or written down entirely if the issuing bank's capital drops below a pre-agreed threshold.
The goal of this paper is to comprehend the determinants that affect the propensity of banks to issue CoCo bonds. In other words, we extend the present literature by exploring the kind of bank has propensity to issuance this bond at the global level. Furthermore, there is a lack of research about the CoCo bonds issued by the banks of BRICS countries.
Although most empirical research about the theme is focused on developed countries, see for instance (Avdjiev et al., 2015) and Vallée (2015) , BRICS's banks -especially those in China and India -were responsible for the biggest aggregate amount of bonds issued in the period [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] . Therefore, we discuss the motivation for BRICS's banks to issue
CoCo bonds and we compare these banks' determinants to issue these bonds with those of developed and other emerging countries.
The papers is organized as follows. Section 2 review related literature about CoCo bond market. In Section 3 we have the data sample. In Section 4 we describe our empirical strategy and in Section 5 we present the results. In Section 6 we have a robustness analysis and Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
CoCos are instruments similar to corporate bonds where the investor has the right to convert the bond into shares . This mechanism permits the firm to continue operating with an adequate level of loss-absorbing capacity (Flannery, 2014) . In this line, it is important to delve more deeply in the concept of this derivative, evaluating its utility, focusing on what kind of situations where it can be implemented, and discussing the advantages and disadvantages. Moreover, it is important to consider data on the CoCo issuance in several countries in the world.
CoCo bonds: characteristics and world market
CoCo bonds are designed to provide a source of capital to banks in distress when private investors are reluctant to supply external capital (Avdjiev et al., 2015) . That is, they are a kind of bail-in mechanism allowing banks to be safer and diminishing the risks of default. Besides that, CoCos are a hybrid type of investment. These hybrid types of investment instruments are composed by at least two components. In the case of CoCo bonds, the components are the liabilities and equity reflected on the balance sheet. CoCos initially act as regular bonds and pay coupons, but they can be converted into shares (not paying coupons, only dividends) when there is a trigger. In some cases, the CoCo can also suffer a write down.
The CoCo contract is based on trigger events. These events are contractual predetermined values that recapitalize the bank by a haircut (write-down) to the bonds or their conversion into shares. These triggers, in turn, can occur during a general market crisis or a moment of specific financial distress affecting the issuing bank. Thus, depending on the contract, four of these types of triggers can be chosen by banks: market-based, accounting, multivariate and regulatory triggers (De Spiegeleer and Schoutens, 2013) . A market-based trigger occurs when the share price decreases to the level defined in the contract. An accounting trigger occurs when the capital ratios of the issuer fall to the level stipulated. The regulatory trigger is an imposition of the bank regulator when it believes the bank has become non-viable. The bank can combine some types in micro and macro triggers, using a multivariate trigger.
As mentioned before, CoCos are convertible bonds developed to help banks to not insolvency during an emergency such as a financial distress. However, the decision of each bank to issue the CoCo depends on how advantageous or disadvantageous these issues will be for them.
Regarding the advantages of issuing CoCo bonds, there are explicit guarantees defined in the CoCo contract. Since investors take on the risk of receiving bad shares, the bank may offer higher coupons to them. There is a high probability of moderate gains and a low probability of high losses, so the gain is limited but the losses are unlimited (De Spiegeleer and Schoutens, 2011) . Another advantage is that once triggered, the conversion into equity happens fast and gives a clear signal to the market (De Spiegeleer and Schoutens, 2011) .
This should take the volatility out of the share price and the credit default swap spreads.
That is, the bank transmitted the message that it is being protected from unforeseen insolvency situations, because swaps of debt (CoCos) for shares improve the financial health of the bank. Indeed, if problems occur, the conversion should improve the capital structure of the bank, working to restore market confidence in the bank.
On the other hand, a critique of CoCos is that instead of giving protection to the market regarding stress of the bank, it may increase the volatility of the share price. If a trigger event appears to be approaching or the likelihood of conversion is perceived as increasing, investors can dynamically hedge the equity exposure embedded in the CoCo by taking a short position in the underlying shares. An inherent problem with this hedging strategy is that the investors are forced to sell more shares when the share price weakens, possibly creating a self-reinforcing downward spiral of the stock price. This situation is referred to as the death-spiral effect (Corcuera et al., 2014) . Another concern is that if banks are allowed to invest in CoCos of financial institution without limitation, there could be a knock-on effect similar to what rocked the banking system in 2008 (De Spiegeleer and Schoutens, 2011) . Namely, the trigger activation could create more triggers by a domino effect or contagious effect. At least, the conversion could induce dilution of the equity stakes of existing shareholders, depending on the conversion mechanism used. With respect to the volume of CoCo bonds issued by countries, China is the country with the largest volume of this hybrid instrument. This issuance has been driven by the need to replace previous subordinated debt which is not in line with the current Basel III rules (Financial Times, 2015) . From the observation of CoCo bond issuance by year, it is possible to notice that 2014 was the year of highest volume. This was an high increase when we compared to 2013.
In 2015, the total volume issued was the second highest amount in the observed period.
A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that Chinese and Indian banks started to issue CoCo bonds for the first time in those years.
In conclusion, according to Financial Times (2016), the expectation for the future scenario is that most of banks will continue to issue AT1 over the coming years, since they are generally cheaper than equity, have tax advantages and count towards leverage ratio requirements.
Recent research
Studies of CoCo issuance are important to obtain a meaningful idea about the propensity of banks to issue CoCo bonds. This topic has only recently been addressed in the literature. Avdjiev et al. (2015) , for instance, analyze banks' motives for issuing CoCos as well as the impact of this issuance on bank CDS spreads and equity prices. The dataset consists entirely of post-crisis CoCos issued between 2009 and 2013. They find that the effect of CoCo issuance on bank funding costs depends crucially on contractual features and bank characteristics. Additionally, their essay shows a negative impact on issuer's CDS spreads, while issuing CoCos with principal write-down has less of an impact.
Also, Vallée (2015) explores the effects of liability management exercises (LMEs) to gain insight into the effects of triggering contingent capital instruments. He analyzes which bank characteristics are associated with implementing LMEs. The results show that large banks, which are also the better positioned for cross-selling, do not seem reluctant to implement these transactions.
In addition, Martynova and Perotti (2015) study the way the design of bank contingent capital affects risk incentives. In other words, the study explicitly investigates how contingent capital affect the bank risk choices, the necessary feature for its optimal design and, pricing. The main result is that CoCo issuance is superior to subordinated debt that can be bailed-in upon default, as it actively discourages ex ante risk choices.
However, when purchasing a CoCo bond, the investor bets that the probability of bankruptcy of the bank is low. This situation occurs because the bond's conversion after the trigger involves financial losses. In this way, it is necessary to check if the bank is experiencing financial distress. This information helps the investor to understand the probability of conversion. As seen in Hesse (2016) , since CoCo has an automatic trigger, it could trigger in bank distress before any formal bail-in proceedings, thus making bail-in capital less risky and more attractive to investors.
The concept of financial distress is linked to idea that certain banks have a high probability of failing to meet their financial obligations, thus the stocks of these financially distressed companies tend to move together. In this respect, several measures of financial distress have been developed, such as accounting variables to predict the probability of bank failure (Zmijewski, 1984) and indexes, like Altman's Z-score (Altman et al., 2000) .
In the next section we analyze, through an exploratory study, the bank characteristics that may affect the propensity of issuing CoCo bonds.
Sample
The data set consists of banks in advanced and emerging economies and is taken from The sample contains 2552 banks from 130 countries. To limit the influence of outliers, we winsorize all variables in the model at the 1st and 99th percentiles. That is, we replace any observation below the 1st percentile with the 1st percentile, and any observation above the 99th percentile with the 99th percentile.
[Insert Table 1 ] [Insert Table 2 and Table 3 ] Table 4 shows the correlation between the variables proposed in the model. The explanatory variables have low pairwise correlation.
Variable Definitions
[Insert Table 4]   9 The present study is exploratory, so the objective is to analyze if the correlations of banks' propensity to issue CoCo bonds persists across time. We use the following logistic panel data regression.
P (y it = 1|x it ) = Λ(δBankF eatures it + γF inancialDistress it ).
(1)
The dependent variable (Y it ) is a binary variable which assumes the value 1 if the bank 
Results
In this section we present the results obtained using random effects, clustered standard errors and country fixed effects. Tables 5 and 6 show [Insert Tables 5 and 6]   Table 5 shows the regressions with financial distress measures calculated according to Shumway (2001) , namely the index used only book value in its composition. On the other hand, Table 6 shows the regressions with financial distress measures calculated at market value according to Campbell et al. (2008) .
The Total Assets variable was positive and significant at 5% level in all models. This means that as the size of the bank increases, the propensity to issue a CoCo bond rises.
Interpreting the marginal effect in the first column, when an increase of one unit in ln.
Total Assets causes the probability of issuing a CoCo bond to increase by 2.1%, keeping other variables constant. The coefficients of marginal effects are shown in Table 7 .
For European banks, the results showed that rising value of Risk Weighted Assets decreased the probability of CoCo issuance. The best-capitalized banks and those with high RWA levels are less likely to issue these hybrid instruments. The financial distress measures in both tables were not significant.
In turn, for BRICS banks, Leverage (TLMTA) was positive and significant, meaning that more indebted banks are more likely to issue CoCo bonds. This corroborates the fact that banks of the BRICS countries are trying to meet the Basel III rules and replacing subordinated debt with additional Tier 1 debt. In addition to bank size and financial distress, the variable Tier 1 Capital was positive and significant and Total Loans and RWA were negative and significant.
Emerging countries followed the same pattern as the BRICS, with total assets and 2 Denomination of five countries among the fastest growing emerging markets: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 3 As a proxy for classifying countries as emerging, we use the 189 member countries of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), according to the World Bank. It works closely with the rest of the World Bank Group to help developing countries reduce poverty, promote economic growth, and build prosperity. leverage variables positive and significant. Nevertheless, the other variables (Tier 1 Capital and RWA) were not significant, so no increase in the likelihood of banks in these countries to issue CoCo bonds was noted.
6 Robustness Analysis
Country Fixed Effects
The sample is composed of banks from different countries, each of which has its particularities regarding regulation, economic model, social policy, etc. In order to minimize these contrasts, we separate the sample into three groups (BRICS, Europe, IBRD) because of the broadly similar economic structures and governmental regulations. Moreover, we ran the model with a dummy variable for each country. Thus, each country had its own intercept, increasing the explanatory power of the model and avoiding omitted variable bias.
Contract design
We tested robustness of the main models by dividing the sample according to contract design, namely we used the capital type after CoCo trigger activation. Thus, we formed two sub-samples "Equity conversion" and the "Write Down". This division enabled assessing the heterogeneity in the sample. Of course, write-downs are riskier for the investors and demand higher premiums and larger collateral. This results is consistent with Hesse (2016) who mention that investors are aware of the incentive problem created in write-down CoCo bons, and demand a yield premium for that feature.
[Insert Table 8] In the same way, we used the status of Basel III rules implementation 4 to divide the sample into countries that have and have not adopted these rules. The dummy variable is based on the report of the Bank for International Settlements BIS (2016). Thus, we estimate the model in equation 1. The results are shown in Table 9 . For the countries that have adopted Basel III rules, the results were the same as in the previous tables, namely the Total Asset variable was positive and significant.
[Insert Table 9] With this approach, it is possible to see the determinants of CoCo issuance in both ways that they can be issued. By comparing the differences between both groups, I was also able to draw better conclusions about the causal mechanisms behind the decision of a bank to issue CoCo or not.
Conclusion
In this paper we found evidence of the determinants of banks to issue CoCo bonds.
Moreover, banks issuing CoCo bonds in the BRICS and other emerging countries are the larger ones ("too big to fail") and have high leverage, so they are using the issuance of CoCo bonds mainly in an attempt to join the Basel III rules and reduce indebtedness.
On the large scale, this paper contributes to the discussion on the issuance of CoCo bonds and its economic and politic implications. Given the results from ours analysis, the investor understand the incentives for bank issuance the CoCo bond is not homogeneous across globe, it allows him diversify investments and make strategies. The paper indeed supports the view that large banks has more benefit with bank regulation thought the issuance of financial instruments.
Going Forward, important extensions are related to other possible instruments that 4 Basel III Capital: In December 2010, the Committee released Basel III, which set higher levels for capital requirements and introduced a new global liquidity framework. The committee members agreed to implement Basel III from January 1, 2013, subject to transitional and phase-in arrangements (BIS, 2016) 4.
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1. ln TOTAL ASSET The dependent binary variable assumes value 1 if the bank issued CoCo bonds in the year, and 0 otherwise. The logistic regression is estimated by maximum likelihood and standard errors are clustered at the bank level. Since these variables have high correlation, the last three variables are all scaled by total assets, expressed as percentages (coding d.). The financial distress measures were calculated by book value in accordance with Shumway (2001) . Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001. Source: Bloomberg, author's calculations. Tables 5 and 6 . In estimation, the probability of a positive outcome assuming that the fixed effect is zero. Source: Bloomberg, author's calculations. To check the robustness of the main model depicted in Section 3.3 I divided the sample according to the capital type after CoCo trigger, forming two sub-samples "Equity conversion" and "Write Down". The dependent binary variable assumes value 1 if the bank issued CoCo bond in the year, and 0 otherwise. The logistic regression is estimated by maximum likelihood and standard errors are clustered at the bank level. Since these variables have high correlation, the last three variables are all scaled by total assets, expressed as percentages (coding d.). The variables of financial distress measures were calculated by book value in accordance with Shumway (2001) and Campbell et al. (2008) . Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001. Source: Bloomberg, authors calculations. To check the robustness of the main model depicted in Section 3.3 I divided the sample according to BIS (2016) for status of implementation of Basel III by country. Thus, the countries in the "YES" columns adopted Basel III rules, and those in the "NO" columns did not. The dependent binary variable assumes value 1 if bank issued CoCo bonds in the year, and 0 otherwide. The logistic regression is estimated by maximum likelihood and standard errors are clustered at the bank level. Since these variables have high correlation, the last three variables are all scaled by total assets, expressed as percentages (coding d.). The variables of financial distress measures were calculated by book value in accordance with Shumway (2001) and Campbell et al. (2008) . Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001. Source: Bloomberg, BIS, author's calculations.
